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RESTORING THE PEERS IN THE "BULWARK":
BLAKELY V WASHINGTON AND THE
COURT'S JURY PROJECT
RICHARD E. MYERS II*
In this Article, Professor Myers argues that the right to a jury is a
mainstream value that is at the center of an evolving jurisprudence
over the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. It is, perhaps
counterintuitively, a mainstream value supported most powerfully
not by the centrists of the Supreme Court, but by the left and right
wings. He explores the Court's recent expansion of the jury right in
the line of cases culminating in Blakely v. Washington and United
States v. Booker and anchors it in this Symposium's consideration
of the constitutional center.
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people's rule and the most efficient way of teaching them how
to rule well.
-Alexis de Tocqueville, 1835.1
INTRODUCTION
The right of every criminal defendant in the United States
charged with a serious crime to trial by a jury of his peers is a
mainstream American value. The jury right appears twice in the
Constitution, in Article III and in the Sixth Amendment,3 and has
been incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment Basic civics classes nationwide teach this right to
schoolchildren by the millions, and, like so much else of our legal
system, this right is reinforced by the almost daily news coverage of
some new crime of the century, and by the popular culture in the
myriad television shows and movies devoted to the criminal trial.
William Blackstone famously described the right to a jury trial two
centuries ago as the "grand bulwark" of English liberty.'
Yet the contours of the right to a jury trial are at the core of a
wide-ranging, high stakes battle over the future of structured
sentencing schemes in many states and in federal courts nationwide.
In July of 2004, the United States Supreme Court decided Blakely v.
Washington,6 which held that the jury must find every fact necessary
for the imposition of a sentence, derailing the nation's twenty-five
year experiment with mandatory sentencing guidelines at both the
state and federal levels. Blakely reshaped the critical question by
defining the relevant maximum sentence as "the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 276 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., Penguin Classics 2000) (1835).
2. "The Trial of all Crimes ... shall be by jury; and such Trial shall be held in the
State where the said Crimes shall have been committed." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
3. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ("The deep commitment of the
Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law
enforcement qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the States.").
5. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 342
(1769).
6. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
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verdict or admitted by the defendant,"7  overturning the judicial
factfinding at the sentencing phase that was standard under many
state structured sentencing schemes. In January of 2005, in United
States v. Booker,8 the Court held that this principle applied to the
United States Sentencing Guidelines as well.
This Article does two things-it examines the right to a jury trial,
arguing that it is a mainstream value and examining it against
conceptions of the constitutional core outlined by Professor Cass
Sunstein and Professor Akhil Amar. It then examines the current
Court's path to the holdings in Blakely and Booker9 and explores the
counterintuitive voting lineup on the Court in the recent line of jury
cases, where the most conservative and most liberal justices joined
forces to adopt the more expansive view of this mainstream value,
over vigorous objections from the "centrists." The opinions in these
cases reveal that the so-called "centrist" Justices on the current Court
have difficulty identifying the right to jury trial-at least as defined by
the Blakely majority-as a mainstream value. The unconventional
lineup in the Blakely/Booker line of cases confounds the conventional
wisdom, as well as the social scientists' models. In each case in the
Blakely line, Justices Thomas and Scalia joined with Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg and Souter to uphold the rights of criminal defendants
against the state, declaring particular practices detrimental to
defendants to be unconstitutional." These cases, which together have
fundamentally altered state and federal structured sentencing
guidelines systems, suggest that for some reason, the "centre cannot
hold.""
7. Id. at 2537 (emphasis in original).
8. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
9. See infra notes 49-83 and accompanying text. The jury's role in finding facts
essential to the defendant's sentence was explored in a line of cases beginning with Jones
v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), followed by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004)
and culminating this term with United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
10. The Court's jury project is considered the result of a "counterintuitive" alignment
of interests in part because the Justices typically labeled "most conservative" find
themselves voting with the Justices labeled "most liberal," and Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy, Justices typically considered the center of the Court, and hence the swing votes,
find themselves in dissent-vociferously so in Blakely where they proclaim that the
consequences of the Court's decision are potentially horrific. That majority collapsed in
Booker, when Justice Ginsburg switched sides regarding the appropriate remedy under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The remedy issues at the federal level are fascinating,
but are beyond the scope of this paper.
11. Apocalyptic predictions notwithstanding, the result has not been quite as
2005] 1385
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The Court's holding in Blakely extends a line of recent cases
exploring the meaning of the right to a jury trial and establishes a
readily understood principle for deciding what the right means and
when it is being eroded. The Blakely line of cases shows that the jury
stands at a constitutional crossroads where substantive and structural
issues overlap. The jury right implicates substantive concerns critical
to the left, such as innocence, appropriate levels of punishment, and
proportionality, as well as structural concerns critical to judicial
conservatives, such as separation of powers and democratic theory
principles. This position ensures that the right to a jury trial will
endure as a core constitutional value. Finally, the Blakely and Booker
decisions slow a trend of legislative reallocation of responsibilities in
the criminal justice system in favor of those laid out in the
Constitution and, while it is too early to tell, may lead in the long
term to a reexamination of other functions of the jury.
I. THE JURY AS A MAINSTREAM VALUE
A. What is the Center?
Defining the constitutional center is a difficult exercise. Creating
a single answer that proves universally satisfactory is impossible. The
participants in this Symposium presented a wide range of views on
our topic: Locating the Constitutional Center, Centrist Judges and
Mainstream Values. 2  There are political scientists discussing
attitudinal, spatial, and strategic actor models, with various empirical
methods for triangulating the center of the Court with mathematical
precision.13 There are essays considering the role of specific Justices
cataclysmic as some would suggest:
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
Surely some revelation is at hand...
WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, The Second Coming, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B.
YEATS (definitive ed. 1956).
12. 83 N.C.L. REV. 1089, 1089-1418 (2005).
13. See generally Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States
Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005) (introducing a method for locating the
median Justice and offering two contemporary applications assessing emerging pieces of
1386 [Vol. 83
2005] THE COURTAND THE JURY 1387
as exponents of particular views of centrist jurisprudence, both
historically and on the current Court. 4
We could discuss the center of the current natural court-the
center that depends on the swing voter-i.e., the "what did the swing
Justice have for breakfast?" center. 15  Or the so-called "political"
center that depends on ex ante definitions of the political left, right
and center (liberal, conservative and moderate) that are undoubtedly
controversial and heavily freighted with value judgments regarding
certain issues. 6 Or there is centrist jurisprudential methodology,
where the reference points depend on one's view of the
appropriateness of judicial review, analysis of the principles of judicial
restraint and activism, and determinations of where on the
activist/restraint spectrum the "center" lies. 7 It is possible that the
degree to which Justices predictably vote along certain predefined
lines squarely places them on one or the other end of the "spectrum,"
and the center is nothing more than the space occupied by the
Justices with the least doctrinally consistent worldviews. That is, the
center belongs to the unpredictable voters. We could reverse-
wisdom about the Court); Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Supreme Court,
Congress, and Judicial Review, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1323 (2005) (testing and finding no
evidence to support the hypothesis that the ideological difference between the median
member of the Supreme Court and Congress constrains the Court's constitutional
decisions).
14. See generally Louis D. Bilionis, Grand Centrism and the Centrist Judicial
Personam, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1353 (2005) (analyzing the jurisprudence of the present
Supreme Court, particularly that of Justice Kennedy, and arguing that Justice Kennedy's
concept of centrism is a composition of recognizing normative values and protecting them
via judicial doctrines); William E. Leuchtenburg, Charles Evans Hughes: The Center
Holds, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1187 (2005) (looking back at the role of Charles Evans Hughes as
the Supreme Court "center"); Mark Tushnet, "Meet the New Boss": The New Judicial
Center, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1205 (2005) (utilizing the Federal Guidelines on Constitutional
Litigation as a springboard for a discussion of the Supreme Court's "new center").
15. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Interdisciplinary Due Diligence: The Case for Common
Sense in the Search For the Swing Justice, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 187, 202-03 (1996)
(describing three alternative approaches for determining the Court's most "powerful"
Justice); Paul Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 63, 64-66 (1996) (explaining that a "passive
swing voter" gains influence in the Court).
16. For an excellent discussion of some of these line-drawing difficulties, see Ernest
A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1181-
1204 (2002).
17. See, e.g., Bilionis, supra note 14; Bradley C. Canon, A Framework for the Analysis
of Judicial Activism, in SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 385, 387-89
(Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982) (noting the difficulty of defining
"judicial activism").
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engineer the question, by seeing which Justices vote in the majority
the most, and then look at the opinions of that Justice or those
Justices to divine which principles they use to distinguish themselves
from the other Justices. Or we could talk about drafting centrist
opinions, or Justices who have succeeded as coalition builders.
Each of these approaches has value, but they are focused on the
centrist method, or on defining the centrist judge, rather than on
defining mainstream values. This Article is focused on mainstream
values, which for purposes of this Article are defined as core values
that are consistent over time, that can be expected to endure despite
changes in the composition of the Supreme Court, and that can be the
subject of meaningful normative discussion. It has a temporal
component-one that operates in both directions-looking backward
to text and original understanding and forward to evolving
conceptions of ordered liberty. In the course of this normative
discussion, one can examine which principles have reached the
mainstream, which should become part of the mainstream, and which
principles were intended by the founders to be there. The
Constitution has both a substantive core (our enduring values) and a
procedural core (the means by which we protect these values), and we
can discuss the extent to which these are mutually reinforcing. This
Article focuses on the debate Blakely has ignited over the role of the
jury precisely because of the overlap between the normative debate
about the jury's proper procedural role and the substance it is
intended to protect. When the dissenters accused the majority of
doctrinaire formalism-elevating form over substance and
reintroducing known flaws into the criminal justice system in an
attempt to hew closely to an outdated view of the jury's role-they
precisely missed the point. In this instance, form is substance.
The substantive content of the mainstream in many ways
resembles that referred to as the "core" by Professor Cass Sunstein in
his book, One Case at a Time. 8 In Professor Sunstein's view, these
commitments are at the core because they are widely shared,
judicially enforceable, and draw the support of conservatives as well
as liberals, as well as the support of those on either side of the debate
about the appropriate role of judges in enforcing them.19 Professor
Sunstein elaborates ten substantive commitments that he believes
18. CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999).
19. Id. at 63-68.
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comprise the core of American constitutional law: protection against
unauthorized imprisonment; protection of political dissent; the right
to vote; religious liberty; protection against physical invasion of
property; protection against police abuse of person or property; the
rule of law; no torture, murder, or physical abuse by government;
protection against slavery or subordination on the basis of race or sex;
and substantive protection of the human body against invasion. ° We
can call this "core" a baseline for the substantive portion of the
constitutional center, our mainstream values, without doing violence
to his vision or the themes of this symposium.
2 1
In addition, Professor Sunstein notes that "[m]any structural
issues, involving separation of powers and federalism, contain a
substantive core. '22 As he notes, these structural issues, much like the
substantive commitments he elaborates, are at the center of an
ongoing debate about which procedural principles belong in the core.
Moreover, by their very nature, they may call for a different degree of
enforcement. The scope of the laws ultimately affected by structural
issues might be broader, which consequently may require that the
lines be drawn brighter. As Sunstein notes: "Perhaps structural issues
require a greater degree of certainty, in general, than issues of
individual rights.
23
Professor Akhil Amar might not use precisely the same language
as Professor Sunstein, but he has written extensively on the
composition of the structural component of the constitutional center,
and in particular has contributed early and often to this emerging
debate on the role of the jury.24 His exposition on the historical role
of structure for the Framers of the Constitution lies at the heart of his
book The Bill of Rights: "A close look at the Bill reveals structural
20. Id. at 63. Many commentators have taken their pass at describing these core
values. The number of values may vary, but it is in many ways a reflection of the degree to
which we subdivide these central principles, not to whether or not they are there.
21. There are certainly other ways of parsing the list, as Professor Bilionis explores in
his article for this Symposium. See Bilionis, supra note 14.
22. SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 63.
23. Id.
24. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 81-118 (1998) (arguing that the
Framers saw jurors as protectors of democracy, filling multiple roles in the new Republic);
Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1169, 1169-76 (1995) (arguing that the text of the Bill of Rights demonstrates the
centrality of the jury right in the eyes of the Framers); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1182-1203 (1991) (arguing that the Framers
viewed the jury right as central to the protection of popular and local will).
2005] 1389
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ideas tightly interconnected with language of rights."25 The idea that
specific substantive rights are coupled with and amplified by
particular procedural protections is not unique, but it is well
expounded by Amar.
To oversimplify grossly, the general assumption underlying many
discussions of this issue seems to be that the "left" is concerned first
with the substantive core, which governs issues of individual rights,
and the "right" is concerned first with the structural core, which
governs questions such as separation of powers and federalism. This
is a gross oversimplification and an artificial division because the two
components of the core are mutually reinforcing and because the first
is impossible without the second, while the second is unnecessary
without the first. The reason we have a separation of powers and
structural limitations on the government is because we are concerned
with protecting the freedoms we hold dear.26 Nevertheless, if we
assume that jurists might reasonably embark first down one or the
other of these separate paths when beginning a constitutional
analysis, their mutually reinforcing nature makes it apparent that we
can expect these paths to converge when the issue at hand is one that
belongs in the constitutional core. As we shall see, the Blakely
explication of the jury's role fits into both Sunstein's and Amar's
visions of the mainstream.
1. The Missing Centrists
The odd lineup of votes in the Blakely line of cases-with the
Court's most "conservative" Justices, Scalia and Thomas, joining the
most "liberal," Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, in this majority-
suggests that there is something more at play than the political
scientists' models can explain. It is worth taking a moment to
consider why the Blakely lineup strikes us as odd. Political scientists
studying the Court are wont to use "spatial" or "attitudinal" models,
which array the Justices from left to right and predict that the Justices
will vote essentially along that line, with Souter, O'Connor and
Kennedy as the likely swing votes, and with most 5-4 votes predicted
25. AMAR, supra note 24, at xii.
26. "Which values ... qualify as sufficiently important or fundamental or
whathaveyou to be vindicated by the Court against other values affirmed by legislative
acts?" ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 55 (1962).
27. In part that is because the social science models are descriptive, not normative,
and thus are not intended to identify shifts in mainstream values.
1390 [Vol. 83
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by Justice O'Connor's vote.28 The spatial models of the Court's
behavior suggest that the critical issue to be considered is the array of
voting blocs.29 The breaks between the blocs, these authors suggest,
may be less significant than the consistency of the alignment.3 ° In the
traditional formulation of this spatial model, the Justices on the Court
are arrayed from left to right as follows: Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer,
Souter, O'Connor, Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas.
31
This spatial model replicates the lineup offered in more
traditional legal articles, which describe the alignment as having the
"liberals" on the left and the "conservatives" on the right.32
O'Connor, Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas are generally
considered conservatives, with Scalia and Thomas commonly called
the Court's most conservative Justices, and O'Connor and Kennedy
regarded as the likely swing voters. While there are definite problems
with the assumptions underlying these labels, they are nonetheless in
general use.
The Supreme Court Forecasting Project has created a computer
model applying the political scientists' alignment theories, based upon
a series of "forecasting trees," which use relatively simple variables as
predictors.3  This computer model was more adept at predicting the
likely votes of the Supreme Court than were the members of a panel
of experts the Project had assembled.34 In addition, it is clear that the
approach of the social scientists has influenced traditional legal
scholarship.35
However, Jones, Apprendi, Ring, Blakely, and Booker confound
28. See Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and
Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1150, 1157-59 (2004).
29. See id. at 1157-60.
30. See id. at 1151-58.
31. See id. at 1158 n.29.
32. For an excellent discussion of the breakdown in the taxonomy of liberal and
conservative, see Young, supra note 16, at 1181-1203.
33. The participants in the Supreme Court Forecasting Project are participants in this
Symposium and explain their project better than I can. See Martin et al., supra note 13.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the Twenty-First
Century, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 1 (2002) ("The use of social science-of psychology
in particular-to inform legal theory and practice is fast becoming the latest craze in the
pages of legal academia."); Symposium, Is Justice Just Us? A Symposium on the Use of
Social Science to Inform the Substantive Criminal Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 601, 604-06
(2000) (explaining the importance of social science in the formation and practice of law).
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the models.36 In each of these cases, Justices Thomas and Scalia split
with Rehnquist, Kennedy and O'Connor, whom the model predicted
would be their allies.37 More specifically, the Supreme Court
Forecasting Project's computer model predicted that in each of these
cases the decisions would be decided in the government's favor, with
Scalia and Thomas in the majority, and with Ginsburg, Stevens and
Souter in dissent.38 Instead, the predicted conservative blocs split and
the left and the right of the Court identified a mainstream value that
was the basis for this new coalition.39 How they arrived at that value
we will now explore.
2. The Mainstream, the Juror, and the Blakely Line of Cases
Now let us turn to the way in which this line of cases locates a
portion of the mainstream. In Blakely, the Court extended the reach
of Apprendi, which held that the Sixth Amendment requires that
"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.-
40
Blakely defined "statutory maximum" as "the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant."' In Blakely, that meant that
the Washington state scheme, which permitted an increase in the
defendant's sentence on the basis of facts found by the judge by a
preponderance of the evidence, violated the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial because someone other than the jury was deciding
36. The conceptual difficulties that the Blakely line presents come as no surprise to
the forecasters. See Ruger et al., supra note 28, at 1158. ("The only type of decision that
flunks the spatial model is one where, say, Justices Scalia and Thomas vote with Stevens,
Ginsburg and Souter to vacate a defendant's sentence and Justice Breyer is with
Rehnquist, O'Connor and Kennedy in dissent.").
37. See The Washington University Supreme Court Forecasting Model (last visited
Mar. 28, 2005), available at http://wusct.wustl.edu (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
38. Id.
39. The failure of the statistical analysis raises some questions that are beyond the
scope of this paper, and certainly beyond its author's expertise. Does it mean there is
something fundamentally different about the jury that leads to these disparate views,
making it an outlier that the models simply fail to capture? Is there a variable the models
have failed to grasp that would explain the voting pattern? Can it be incorporated into the
models, or will it remain an outlier?
40. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2533 (2004) (quoting Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000)).
41. Id. at 2538 (emphasis in original).
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whether the functional equivalent of elements had been established.42
While the Court stated that the decision was limited to the case
before it, there was no avoiding its implications for all federal and
state structured sentencing schemes.43
No case from the Court's 2003 Term more affected the day-to-
day lives of practicing lawyers than Blakely, handed down right
before the Court recessed for the summer. Its logic "cast a long
shadow"'  over the viability of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
leaving the administration of criminal justice "discombobulated. 45
Justice O'Connor, writing in dissent, warned that "the practical
consequences of today's decision may be disastrous,"46 and chided the
majority for "ignor[ing] the havoc it is about to wreak on trial courts
across the country."47 In Booker and Fanfan, the Court decided that
the logic of Blakely would be applied to the Federal Guidelines.48
As the Court reexamined the jury's role in these four cases,
49
Jones, Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely, Justices from the left and the
right discussed the historical and structural importance of the jury,
moving from a precatory warning in Jones that the jury's role needed
to be taken seriously, to establishing its role in moving a defendant
between schemes with different statutory maxima in Apprendi, to
emphasizing in Blakely that only the jury can find the facts necessary
to support a sentence. As we shall see, the opinions demonstrate that
the structural role of the jury is equally important to both ends of the
Court.
The first case in the Court's reexamination of the jury's role was
Jones v. United States."0 In Jones, the Court engaged in a largely
rhetorical skirmish over the role of the jury, but the contours of the
42. Id. at 2537-38.
43. Id. at 2543 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
44. See United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 510 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.
Ct. 11 (2004).
45. See id. at 521 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
46. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537-38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 2549 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
49. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), where the Court
decided that a prior conviction need not be proved to a jury, see id. at 228-48, is an
aberration. Almendarez-Torres necessitates the "other than the fact of a prior conviction"
proviso in the Apprendi and Blakely holdings. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
490 (2000); Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536. However, Justice Thomas, a member of the
Almendarez-Torres majority, has since stated that he believes Almendarez-Torres was
wrongly decided. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 521 (Thomas, J., concurring).
50. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
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coming battlefield were laid out with surprising clarity. Jones was a
statutory construction case involving the application of the federal
carjacking statute." The Court resolved the construction issue to find
that provisions enhancing the penalties faced by defendants
amounted to aggravated versions of the crime, with additional
elements that must be proved to the jury.52 In explaining its decision
to interpret the statute this way, when it quite easily could have gone
in another direction, the Court said it was doing so to avoid grave
constitutional concerns: "Diminishment of the jury's significance by
removing control over facts determining a statutory sentencing range
would resonate with the claims of earlier controversies, to raise a
genuine Sixth Amendment issue not yet settled."53
The lineup that would carry forward through Blakely was set.
Justice Souter-writing for a majority that included Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Ginsburg, and Stevens-noted the "grave and doubtful
constitutional questions" that arose when one began to consider the
continuing erosion of the historical role of the jury.54 From the very
beginning, the Court's jury project has been stated in terms of the
critical procedural safeguards embodied in the Constitution:
The constitutional safeguards that figure in our analysis concern
not the identity of the elements defining criminal liability but
only the required procedures for finding the facts that
determine the maximum permissible punishment; these are the
safeguards going to the formality of notice, the identity of the
factfinder, and the burden of proof.5
Justice Souter further stressed the historic importance of the jury
right, and its role as the protector of freedom:
Identifying trial by Jury as "the grand bulwark" of English
liberties, Blackstone contended that other liberties would
remain secure only "so long as this palladium remains sacred
and inviolate, not only from all open attacks, (which none will
be so hardy as to make) but also from all secret machinations,
which may sap and undermine it.. .
51. Id. at 229.
52. Id. at 239.
53. Id. at 248.
54. Id. at 239 (internal quotations omitted).
55. Id. at 243 n.6.
56. Id. at 246 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE 342-44).
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The Court also foreshadowed one central focus of the debate-
who gets to define elements of a crime, as opposed to "sentencing
factors." The Court was fully aware that conceding that right to
Congress essentially gave away the issue, stating that "[a]n unlimited
choice over characterizing a stated fact as an element would leave the
State substantially free to manipulate its way out of Winship.'' 57 This
rhetorical exchange on the Court set the agenda, but the dialogue had
not yet risen to the level of a national debate.
In Apprendi, these ruminations on the hypothetical danger posed
by a particular statutory construction gave way to a holding that
overturned a state conviction. In Apprendi, Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, Scalia and Thomas joined forces in an opinion which held
that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. ' 58  Charles C. Apprendi, Jr. pled guilty to second-degree
possession of a firearm, which carried a maximum sentence of ten
years.59 The trial judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the defendant had been motivated by racial animus, raising the
maximum sentence to twenty years.6°  He then sentenced the
defendant to twelve years.61 Apprendi appealed.
The Court held that the enhancement violated the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because the judge and not the
jury found that the animus existed, and because the finding was by a
preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.62
The defendant has a right to "'a jury determination that [he] is guilty
of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a
reasonable doubt.' "63 The jury, not the judge, was the
constitutionally appointed trier of fact.
One critical issue limiting the potential application of the
Apprendi opinion was the fact that the judge's finding changed the
applicable "statutory maximum" penalty to which the defendant was
exposed.64 In Apprendi, the applicable statutory maximum was the
57. Id. at 240-41.
58. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
59. Id. at 470.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 471.
62. Id. at 491.
63. Id. at 490 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 201 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532
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maximum the criminal statute set for the underlying offense of
conviction. After Apprendi, the lower federal courts consistently held
that the Apprendi requirement of jury factfinding did not apply in
cases where the facts were used to move the defendant's sentence
within the range of possible sentences below the statutory maximum
applicable to the offense.65 The jury was in the mix, but under the
opinions issued by the appellate courts, legislators could work around
it quite easily by denominating certain facts as "sentencing factors"
rather than elements of the crime.
Next came Ring. In Ring, the Court held that a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury requires that a jury, and not a judge,
find the existence of facts that would raise the defendant's possible
sentence from life in prison to death.6 This time, Justice Kennedy
joined the majority, although he maintained his view that Apprendi
was wrongly decided.67 But there was no doubt after Ring that the
factfinding of the jury was critical in the decision to sentence someone
to death, and that any other system was unconstitutional. Some
thought that Ring might be an aberration because of the skewing
effect of the death penalty, and was the outer limit of the Court's jury
reinvigoration project.
As Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence in Ring, the issue was
more fundamental:
I believe that the fundamental meaning of the jury-trial
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts essential to
imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant
receives-whether the statute calls them elements of the
offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-must be found by
U.S. 937 (2001) ("[T]he relevant maximum tinder Apprendi is found on the face of the
statute rather than in the Sentencing Guidelines.").
65. See United States v. Merritt, 361 F.3d 1005, 1015 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Pettigrew, 346 F.3d 1139, 1147 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 2003); United States v. Goodine, 326 F.3d
26, 32-34 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Parmalee, 319 F. 3d 583, 592 (3d Cir. 2003);
United States v. Floyd, 343 F.3d 363, 372 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 124 S. Ct. 2190
(2004); United States v. Banks, 340 F.3d 683, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Ortiz, 318 F.3d 1030, 1039 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); United States v. Luciano, 311
F.3d 146, 151 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Cannady, 283 F.3d 641, 649 (4th Cir, 2002),
cert. denied 537 U.S. 936 (2002); United States v. Tarwater, 308 F.3d 494, 517 (6th Cir.
2002); United States v. Ochoa, 311 F.3d 1133, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Mendez-Zamora, 296 F.3d 1013, 1020 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1063 (2002).
66. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 613 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.68
In his Ring concurrence, Justice Scalia foreshadowed the ultimate
result in Blakely. Justice Scalia explained his balancing of the relative
importance of what he saw as competing constitutional issues, hJs
reaction against the Court's "death-is-different" jurisprudence, and
his belief in the centrality of the jury.69 In Ring, he decided that in the
absence of knowledge that the states' decisions regarding allocation
of the burden of proof were being skewed by what he saw as the
Court's contorted Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, he would vote
the principle favoring the jury.
Any thoughts that the Court's jury project was limited in scope
were definitively rejected in Blakely. In Blakely, the Court extended
the holding of Apprendi to cover the structured sentencing scheme in
effect in the state of Washington. Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr. pled
guilty to kidnapping his estranged wife at knife point in violation of a
Washington state statute.7" The facts admitted in his plea, without
more, carried a presumptive maximum sentence range of fifty-three
months.71 Under the state of Washington's system, a defendant could
have his sentence enhanced if there was a finding of "deliberate
cruelty."72 After a three-day bench hearing, the court found that the
defendant had acted with deliberate cruelty and imposed an
exceptional Sentence of ninety months.73 The Washington State
Supreme Court denied discretionary review, and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
74
The Court reversed, applying the rule expressed in Apprendi:
"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 75
Looking back at Apprendi and Ring, the Court stated that "[i]n each
case, we concluded that the defendant's constitutional rights had been
violated because the judge had imposed a sentence greater than the
maximum he could have imposed under state law without the
68. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 610-12.
70. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2534 (2004).
71. Id. at 2535.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2536.
75. Id. at 2533 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
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challenged factual finding."76  The Court emphasized that the key
issue was the sentence that the court could impose based on facts
admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury. "Had the judge
imposed the 90-month sentence solely on the basis of the plea, he
would have been reversed."77  If additional factual findings were
required before the judge could increase his sentence, those must be
proved to a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, because they were the
functional equivalent of elements of an aggravated crime:78
Whether the judge's authority to impose an enhanced sentence
depends on finding a specified fact (as in Apprendi), one of
several specified facts (as in Ring), or any aggravating fact (as
here), it remains the case that the jury verdict alone does not
authorize the sentence. The judge acquires that authority only
upon finding some additional fact.79
Blakely was decided by the same five to four majority that
decided Apprendi. Justice Kennedy, who had voted with the Ring
majority, jumped ship. There was no doubt about the potential
implications of the decision. The dissenters, who saw no principled
way to distinguish the Federal Sentencing Guidelines from the
Washington state scheme held unconstitutional by the Court, warned
that the Court was about to undo twenty years worth of work on
structured sentencing."0 They warned that the evils Congress was
attempting to solve-problematic disparity in sentencing, with
disturbing evidence that race and class issues lurked in the
background-would return in full force if the Court went forward.
81
In an attempt to head off the implications, the dissenters offered a
range of policy arguments for a more "nuanced" analysis of the issues
in the case.82 It mattered not. For the majority, the critical issue was
the role of the jury as a "circuitbreaker" in the democratic system.83
The legislature was not going to be allowed to hardwire around that
circuitbreaker by redefining the "elements" of the crime and short-
circuiting the jury's role in determining the relevant elements.
76. Id. at 2537.
77. Id. at 2538.
78. Id. at 2538-39.
79. Id. at 2538.
80. Id. at 2549-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 2544-46 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 2547 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
83. "The jury could not function as a circuitbreaker in the State's machinery of justice
if it were relegated to making a determination that the defendant at some point did
something wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts of the crime
the State actually seeks to punish." Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2539 (emphasis in original).
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What is happening in the Blakely line? Have the "conservative"
concerns over structure captured a central place in the opinion
because they would not join an opinion written by a liberal based on a
substantive view of the center? Do we simply have a marriage of
convenience with the liberals along for the ride on Justice Scalia's
historic and structural view of the jury's role because Scalia's opinion
achieves the desired result?" Would they abandon the jury
otherwise? The cases seem to refute such assumptions. It was
Souter, not Scalia, who identified the jury's role as a historic bulwark
in Jones and reintroduced the jury into the discussion of sentencing."
The majority and the dissent in Blakely framed the sentencing issue in
vastly different terms. For the majority, the cardinal sin of the
Washington statutory regime was the way that the jury's role was
undermined by allowing the judge, not the jury, to find critical facts.86
The dissenters thought that the real question was whether in creating
the Guidelines and denominating some facts as sentencing factors, the
Washington legislature had tipped the balance between elements and
sentencing factors.87 The disagreement between the camps turned
largely on their respective assessments of how the Constitution speaks
to this definition of the role of the jury. The majority was concerned
that there be a bright-line test which would define clearly the term
"elements," so that legislators and litigants alike would know when
the Sixth Amendment and the jury trial guarantee was implicated.88
The dissenters favored a balancing test that would place due process
limitations on the legislature's ability to recast elements as sentencing
factors, with the due process limitations kicking in when the
legislature had gone too far.89 Scalia soundly rejected the dissent's
choice of "too far" as an appropriate constitutional standard:
Whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates [the dissent's]
manipulable standard rather than Apprendi's bright-line rule
depends on the plausibility of the claim that the Framers would
have left definition of the scope of the jury power up to judges'
84. One possible view is that requiring aggravating factors to be proven to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt will ultimately reduce sentences in cases where it is difficult to
find admissible evidence, such as drug quantities, and ultimately result in lower sentences.
A skeptic might argue that the Court's liberals are committed to the jury right only so long
as the likely result is pro-defendant and not because of any historic or textual pedigree
that the jury may have.
85. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1999).
86. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537-39.
87. Id. at 2549-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2539-40.
89. Id. at 2547-48 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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intuitive sense of how far is too far. We think that claim is not
plausible at all, because the very reason the Framers put a jury-
trial guarantee in the Constitution is that they were unwilling to
trust the government to mark out the role of the jury.
90
While the effect of the case was to cast serious doubt on the
constitutionality of the federal guideline system, the majority insisted
that its opinion was not intended to be a death knell to structured
sentencing, as the dissenters feared: "This case is not about whether
determinate sentencing is constitutional, only about how it can be
implemented in a way that respects the Sixth Amendment."91
In United States v. Booker,9 2 the Court reaffirmed the position it
took in Blakely, holding that the Sixth Amendment concerns
explored in Blakely applied with equal force to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, for the same reasons. The Court noted that
the Guidelines as written were mandatory, not advisory, and as such
had the force of law, thereby implicating the jury right: "There is no
relevant distinction between the sentence imposed pursuant to the
Washington statutes in Blakely and the sentences imposed pursuant
to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in these cases."93
As the Court noted:
The effect of the increasing emphasis on facts that enhanced
sentencing ranges ... was to increase the judge's power and
diminish that of the jury. It became the judge, not the jury, that
determined the upper limits of sentencing, and the facts
determined were not required to be raised before trial or
90. Id. at 2540. The response to the dissenters also included a classic Scalia footnote:
To be sure, Justice Breyer and the other dissenters would forbid those increases of
sentence that violate the constitutional principle that the tail shall not wag dog.
The source of this principle is entirely unclear. Its precise effect, if precise effect it
has, is presumably to require that the ratio of sentencing-factor add-on to basic
criminal sentence be no greater than the ratio of caudal vertebrae to body in the
breed of canine with the longest tail. Or perhaps no greater than the average such
ratio for all breeds. Or perhaps the median. Regrettably, Apprendi has prevented
full development of this line of jurisprudence.
Id. at 2542 n.13.
91. Id. at 2540. Indeed there is evidence that the two can coexist. See Brief of Amici
Curiae Nat'l Ass'n of Federal Defenders in Support of Respondents at *2, United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 25 (2004) (No. 04-104), United States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 26 (2004)
(No. 04-105) (explaining at length how "[t]he requirements of Blakely are assimilated
readily into the federal sentencing scheme, with little or no change to current statutes or
rules, providing sentences entirely consistent with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and
the United States Sentencing Guidelines").
92. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
93. Id. at 751.
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proved by more than a preponderance. As the enhancements
became greater, the jury's finding of the underlying crime
became less significant.94
Because Congress had created a new system not contemplated by the
founders:
[T]he Court was faced with the issue of preserving an ancient
guarantee under a new set of circumstances. The new
sentencing practice forced the Court to address the question
how the right of jury trial could be preserved, in a meaningful
way guaranteeing that the jury would still stand between the
individual and the power of the government under the new
sentencing regime.95
If one takes the Court at its word, rather than assuming this is
sleight of hand motivated by a dislike of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, there is actually much to consider.96 For the majority, the
right to a jury trial needs to be carefully defined, so that it is not
eroded from within. Much of the change that is taking place, such as
reclassification of elements as sentencing factors, and the stripping
away of the right to argue for nullification, is understood primarily by
insiders. Meanwhile, the public is left with an increasingly mistaken
impression that the jury is serving its symbolic, and historic, function
as a democratic intermediary between the individual and the state. If
the jury right is being hollowed out, the Court is unable to rely on it
to serve as a guardian of the innocent and a true check on both
legislative and executive power.
II. WHAT THE CENTRISTS ARE MISSING ABOUT THIS MAINSTREAM
VALUE
If the BlakleylBooker majority sees the jury right as such a
central value, which must be jealously guarded by the Court, why
does the "centrist" view differ so markedly? Are the cases really
about a fundamental disagreement on the role of the jury? Or are
they really more about the efficient administration of justice? In part,
the dissenters have split with the majority because, Scalia's ridicule
notwithstanding, the dissenters trust the courts, and perhaps the
legislatures, to see that the tail does not wag the dog. That is, they see
94. Id.
95. Id. at 752.
96. This assumption may be harder to make after Booker, where the majority opinion
regarding remedy suggests that Justice Ginsburg was motivated by a dislike of the concept
of mandatory guidelines and sought to restore judicial power to flexibly impose sentences.
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any potential problems with defining the elements of a crime, and the
consequent effects on the jury's role in the system, as a substantive,
and not a structural issue.97 For them, the parsing of elements can be
done with fuzzier logic, without the bright line the majority is calling
for. There are certainly "centrist" positions taken by the dissent in
arguing for upholding guideline sentencing. Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor seem to have great faith in the legislature and the
Sentencing Commission.98 They see it as the Court's job to serve as
the intermediary between the legislature and the defendant, and they
have faith in the Court's ability to police the system before it goes too
far.99 They believe themselves to be exercising restraint that defends
the democratic values inherent in a legislative determination of how
the lines should be drawn. For Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, the
legislators' interests in establishing structured sentencing-
proportionality, predictability, and a sub rosa consideration of racial
bias-outweigh any concerns the Court might have over the
diminished role of the jury.
There are some additional motivations a particular Justice might
have for joining the dissenting opinions. Justice Breyer had a
personal role in creating the Guidelines and thus has more invested in
them than almost anyone in any position, and certainly much more
than any other Justice. 100 Justice O'Connor often writes more like a
legislator than a judge-perhaps unsurprisingly given her
background-and therefore may be more willing to trust the
legislature on this issue, as well as to trust her own ability to fix things
in the event that the legislature gets it wrong. Justice Rehnquist is a
faithful proponent of the Court's oversight power, and perhaps he
sees the practical utility of the Guidelines for the executive when it
comes to leveraging pleas and is unwilling to topple a twenty-five year
old system over the objections of Congress and the executive
branch. 10 1 However, the fact that the explanations hew to what is
97. That is not to say that we can create a purely binary substantive/structural divide.
The jury serves additional democratizing functions, allocating responsibility for the verdict
across the society, and permitting a valuable check on the executive and legislature. For
the conservatives, there is an independent value in hewing closely to the constitutional line
allocating the responsibility for protecting those values to the jury. For liberals, the
question may be whether the historic allocation continues to serve the intended purposes.
98. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2545-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2550-51
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
99. See id. at 2548-49 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2550-51 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
100. See Tony Mauro, Court May Scrap Fed'l Sentencing System, LEGAL TIMES, Oct.
11, 2004, at 8.
101. Justice Kennedy placed the issue of sentencing on the national legal agenda
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generally considered a centrist line does not mean that the debate is
not about the centrality of the jury's role.
A. The Renewed Role of the Jury
Going forward, what can we expect? The jury is regaining
strength as a mainstream actor in the constitutional center, after a
period of institutionalized atrophy. As Amar has noted, the
perceived role of the jury has changed dramatically over time. The
democratic check on the legislature has virtually disappeared. More
importantly, "even the core role of the jury in criminal trials has
seriously eroded over the past two centuries."'12 It is this erosion with
which the Blakely/Booker line of cases is concerned. In the view of
the majority, and of many of their supporters, 03 removing the jury
from the factfinding equation distorted the criminal justice process by
altering the roles of the actors in a way that upset settled
expectations. 10 The judge has been tasked with finding an array of
facts critical to the sentence that has expanded dramatically, while at
the same time, the judge's discretion to alter the defendant's relative
sentence based on those findings has been drastically curtailed.
Meanwhile, the jury had been tasked with finding facts sufficient
to support the verdict, but not with finding the facts essential to
support the sentence. This was unacceptable if the juror really is a
critical player. For some, there is no more critical structural player
for protecting individual freedoms. "If we seek a paradigmatic image
directly when he spoke before the ABA in 2003. See Linda Greenhouse, High Court
Justice Supports Bar Plan to Ease Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2004, at A14. There he
called on all of the participants in the system to actively evaluate the state of incarceration
in America, drawing on examples from the federal courts. Id. In response, the ABA
created the Kennedy Commission to address these issues. Id. Given that the sentences he
deplored are being handed down based on a preponderance of the evidence standard, at
hearings where the rules of evidence do not apply, it is interesting that he is a dissenter.
102. See AMAR, supra note 24, at 98.
103. Brief of Amici Curiae Nat'l Ass'n of Federal Defenders in Support of
Respondents at *2, United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 25 (2004) (No. 04-104), United
States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 26 (2004) (No. 04-105).
104. See United States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d. 79, 83 n.8 (D. Mass. 2004).
Judge Gertner explained why this issue did not come up in indeterminate sentencing
schemes, but did arise where the "Guidelines" actually mandated the sentence a judge
could impose:
The answer is that there were no Sixth Amendment challenges ... because judge
and jury has specialized roles, the jury as fact finder, the judge as the sentencing
expert. However flawed the judge's decision was-and surely many were-it was
not the case that he or she was "usurping a role that did not belong to him or her."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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underlying the original Bill of Rights, we cannot go far wrong in
picking the jury," according to Professor Amar.1 °5 Amar draws this
conclusion based on his textual analysis of the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights, and on a historical examination of the thoughts of the
Framers:
Juries, guaranteed in no fewer than three amendments, were at
the heart of the Bill of Rights ... [w]hat's more, trial by jury in
all federal criminal cases had earlier been mandated by the
clear words of Article III: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.
106
The Blakely line of cases shows that the Court is intent on
reexamining and where necessary expanding that critical structural
role. The Warren Court defined the right to trial by jury as
fundamental:
The question has been asked whether [trial by jury] is among
those ... fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions... [w]e
believe that trial by jury is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice ... [t]he jury trial provisions in the Federal
and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about
the exercise of official power-a reluctance to entrust plenary
powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to
a group of judges."7
The Court has worked its way through a jury-access project that
mirrors a similar project involving the right to vote. African
Americans, women, and other racial minorities were all accorded jury
rights, and the practice of striking jurors for an invidious purpose was
reexamined. 10 8 The questions of who gets to sit on the jury appear to
105. AMAR, supra note 24, at 96.
106. Id. at 83.
107. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,148-56 (1967).
108. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 passim (1986) (banning peremptory
challenges based on invidious racial motivation); Duren v. Missouri., 439 U.S. 357, 360
(1979) (overturning conviction where women were under-represented on venire); Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("Restricting jury service to only special groups or
excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared
with the constitutional concept of a jury trial."); id. at 534-35 (overturning rule excluding
women from jury service unless they explicitly opted in); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 482 (1954) (overturning conviction where Mexican-Americans were excluded);
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195-96 (1946) (overturning federal conviction
because women were barred from jury service although eligible under state law); Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130-32 (1940) (barring exclusion from jury service on the basis of
race).
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be largely resolved. The current reexamination is premised not on
equal protection concerns, but on structural considerations of the role
of the jury as an institution and on defining the logical contours of this
key structural right.
At the very least, we will engage in a fundamental discussion of
the constitutional allocation of the power to define and prosecute
crimes. Under the Guidelines, Congress has attempted to recast the
roles of the various actors, in part because it lacks faith in either to
perform their constitutional duties. The Guidelines were designed to
reduce judges' discretion because the legislators perceived that the
judiciary was abusing that discretion. Rather than creating a single
statutory cap, the legislature wanted an enforceable regime that
would govern the imposition of sentences. But it did not trust juries
to find the wide range of facts it wanted considered at sentencing, so
it reallocated the finding of those facts to the sentencing judge with
the aid of the probation office.
Some saw the flaw in the Guidelines as the divestiture of judges'
individualized sentencing power, rather than the concentration of
power in the hands of the legislature. At first blush, the Blakely line
of cases did not appear to address concerns about the diminished
discretion afforded to judges because the cases were concerned with
the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, not with the appropriate
levels of punishment or the power of the judiciary. However, the
Booker remedial majority made the Federal Guidelines advisory,
which seems to directly address the issue. Whether Congress leaves
the remedy as it is or restores the limits in some other form remains
to be seen.
However, if the Court genuinely seeks to restore the jury as a
structural check on the system, the jury might serve as a solution to
many of the problems that some hoped the judge would resolve.
Remember, under the vision articulated in Blakely, one of the jury's
core historical functions is as a circuitbreaker, intended as a mediating
institution interposed between the state and the individual to ensure
that justice is done in each individual case. This view is contingent on
the reintroduction of jury nullification as a serious, and
constitutionally mandated, check. If mandatory minimum sentences
are too high, the jury can correct the legislature's failure by refusing
to convict. If the maximum sentencing exposure is too severe, the
jury can likewise refuse to convict. Given the choice between jury
factfinding on all of the issues that were previously reserved for
sentencing or restoring the discretion to judges to impose sentence
within the statutory cap, the legislature will have to decide who it
2005] 1405
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
distrusts more."°9 Likewise, if a prosecutor has brought the case in
circumstances which fall outside the heartland of cases that the law
was intended to criminalize, the jury has an independent ability to
acquit the particular defendant and substitute the common-sense of
twelve members of the community for the interested view of the
prosecutor.n °
Why did this majority constitute itself, and what does it tell us
about the constitutional center? At least in part, there was a split
between the pragmatists on the Court, and the formalists,'tt between
balancing tests and bright lines. Some would suggest that that
distinction by its own terms means this is not a centrist line of cases. I
disagree. It is possible to draw bright lines intended to defend centrist
principles, and that is the project on which this Court has embarked.
In this line of jury cases, the Court laid down some principles that will
restrain the actions not only of the courts, but of the state and federal
legislatures. In striking down mandatory guidelines sentencing with
judicial factfinding, the Court has moved beyond case-by-case
consideration of when a legislature may have gone "too far" to
structural themes that invoke issues of separation of powers and the
inherent check on the system imposed by the jury.
It may surprise some that this pro-defendant, anti-government
view is espoused by Justice Scalia and echoed by Justice Thomas.1
12
But it should not. Both Justices are perfectly willing to hold the
government to the highest procedural standards in criminal cases, and
109. Observers have suggested that the Court may be rediscovering the jury because it
is in the middle of a game of "chicken" with the legislature, designed to force precisely
that choice, in the belief that the legislature will ultimately choose the judiciary. While
possible, this writer believes that it is more likely that the Court means precisely what it
says about the jury. In part, the jury is needed as a check on both the legislature and the
judiciary. As Justice Scalia noted during oral argument on Booker and Fanfan, "The right
of a jury trial is meant to protect against whom? [Judges.] The whole reason for a jury
trial is we don't trust judges." See http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/
argument-transcripts/04-104.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
110. The preclusive effect of an acquittal operates only when the jurors are united in
their opposition as to the particular application of the law. In the event of a hung jury, the
state is free to try again.
111. See Stephanos Bibas, Blakely's Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 333,341-42
(2004).
112. The fact that Justices Scalia and Thomas, fully aware that at least in the short term
the decisions will redound to the benefit of defendants, have voted for the new rule in
Blakely certainly belies the simplification that they will be pro-government and anti-
defendant. Deciding ex ante what the "policy preferences" are that really motivate the
Justices is impossible without examining the doctrinal underpinnings of the case.
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both have written opinions endorsing the rule of lenity."3 In Justice
Scalia's view, judges are at their most courageous when they stand up
to the popular will in the criminal arena. "Their most significant
roles, in our system, are to protect the individual criminal defendant
against the occasional excesses of that popular will, and to preserve
the checks and balances within our constitutional system that are
precisely designed to inhibit swift and complete accomplishment of
that popular will."' 14 In Blakely, the majority did both.
Similarly, it may be surprising to some that Justices Ginsburg,
Stevens and Souter joined the Blakely opinion, which rejects
balancing tests in favor of a bright-line rule based largely on the
historic and structural role of the jury. Yet if one considers the
concerns that led to the creation of both a substantive constitutional
right and a procedural protection for it, it should be of little surprise
that the Justices on the left have joined the opinion. Justice Souter,
after all, was the author of the majority opinion that first sounded the
alarm for the jury in Jones."5
The traditional centrist 'strategies followed by O'Connor and
Kennedy-appeal to democdatic values, a desire to decide cases
minimally, concern over the social and political costs of the decision
at bar-were all employed to no avail in the Blakely dissents. 116 In
fact, the tone of the dissents, and of the questions during oral
argument in Booker and Fanfan can fairly be described as painful
indignation. One can almost hear them saying to their clerks, "I can't
believe they aren't listening to us. Our position is so reasonable."
One possible explanation for their failure to carry the day is that the
centrists have simply reached the outer limits of centrism. They ran
into an immovable structural object, the jury, and the majority has
said "this far and no farther." So centrism failed in Blakely. Which,
given the importance of the jury right, was not, on balance, a bad
thing.
But let us not be too hasty. An alternative view, and in my mind
the more useful one, is that it is only the short-term view of
centrism-a view interested more in avoiding conflicts today than in
113. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 246 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(encouraging lenity when faced with an ambiguous statute); Evans v. United States, 504
U.S. 255, 289 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same).
114. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180
(1989).
115. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
116. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2546-48 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2550-51 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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resolving them-that failed. Criminal sentencing raises difficult
questions of political bias and institutional failure. The legislature has
strong institutional imperatives to seem tough on crime-no one can
reasonably expect to go home and campaign on a platform of cutting
back criminal legislation and shortening sentences. Powers are
separated in this area precisely because the individual is likely to
suffer if they are consolidated in any one set of hands. Once we
recognize that these difficult questions regarding the proportionality
and justice of criminal sentences, and of periodic attempts to
reallocate power to the defendant's detriment, will recur over time, it
becomes clear that this is not a problem that can be sidestepped-it
must be solved. The question is, who do we trust to ultimately solve
it-judges making "tail-wagging" determinations, or juries applying
the law to the facts at the level closest to the ground? Or perhaps
more properly, at least for those of us who take textualism seriously,
to whom does the Constitution allocate this decision?117 The majority
has decided that we have a constitutional mechanism in place that we
should allow to operate."8
The renaissance of the jury serves centrist values. It is a
fundamentally democratic, and thus centrist, institution in the sense
that de Tocqueville and Amar have lauded. It is also a centrally
located institution, interposed between the defendant and the
legislature, and between the defendant and the prosecutor. It is also a
localizing institution, allowing a group of people from the same
community as the defendant to determine whether legislators making
decisions at a significant geographical-and possibly cultural-
remove from the defendant are truly expressing the condemnation of
his community. The jury's general acquittal power is intended to
permit it to decide that on these facts, the government has gone too
far. I see no evidence that the twentieth century is so different from
the eighteenth that the Framers' decision that the jury serves best as a
proxy for the conscience of the nation should be overturned by
granting that power to a combination of sentencing commissions,
117. One need not be a textualist to decide that this particular allocation of
responsibility is correct. However, if one is a textualist, then the options for addressing
these concerns are limited. I proceed on the premise that textualism is a valid interpretive
mode, and that the overlap in this instance allows both textualists and those with more
open interpretive views to arrive at the same place.
118. One can envision the majority as the equivalent of constitutional roommates,
shaking their heads as they listen to the dissenters discuss the efficacy of stuffing pillows
into their stereo speakers to lower the volume, then pointing to the volume control and
saying, "Stuffing pillows in might work, but it looks like the designer had a different idea.
Let's try this instead."
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legislators, and judges.
There are two possible views of the Justices' motivations in
reestablishing the jury. One view would accept that the majority
quite reasonably decided that the Constitution's existing framework
calls for the jury to play such a role, which works well enough and
should be left alone. The more ambitious view is that, on balance,
relegating these decisions to the jury is the better system. Either way,
the majority opted for the institutional actor ultimately best suited to
solving the proportionality problems recurrently posed by the
criminal justice system.
One need not be a strict constructionist to believe that the
Constitution properly assigns the role of democratic mediator not to
the court, but to the jury. If we are truly interested, as a centrist
value, in deciding one case at a time, no one does that better than the
jury. It makes its decisions with the fullest possible development of
the facts and with a clear view of the defendant. No one is in a better
position to weigh the social costs of harsh sentencing or overly broad
laws in a particular context than the jury. By moving these
determinations closer to the people, all of the democracy-reinforcing
functions posited by the jury's proponents are allowed to operate.
Forcing the community to see the costs associated with tough-on-
crime legislation by requiring its direct participation in allocating
those costs is a good thing.
To allow the jury to do its job, however, the legislature must pass
statutes that are sufficiently transparent for jurors to make that
determination. Unless the conduct the government seeks to punish is
spelled out in the elements of the crime, the jury cannot act as a
check. Moreover, unless the punishment to which the defendant is
exposed is clear to the jury, it cannot properly serve its buffering role
as the conscience of the community, which leads to the logical
extensions this view of the jury project suggests. How much of the
historic role of juries will be revived? Are we about to begin
addressing questions that have been thought settled? For example, if
the Court is serious about reinvigorating the jury's role as a
constitutionally mandated mediating institution, sentencing people on
the basis of relevant conduct, dismissed conduct, and even acquitted
conduct certainly seems inconsistent with this vision."9 If the Court
119. See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Harris, Ring and the Future of Relevant Conduct
Sentencing, 15 FED. SENT. REP. 88,93-94 (arguing that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S.
79 (1984), should be overruled, and that sentencing on the basis of relevant conduct not
proved to the jury is unconstitutional under the holdings of Apprendi and Ring).
20051 1409
1410 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83
follows through on the more ambitious view, the holding of cases such
as United States v. Watts2° are in jeopardy.'21
III. PRACTICAL MATT7ERS
Notwithstanding the Court's explicit statement that it did not
express an opinion on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,'22 Blakely
resulted in a split of authority in the federal circuit courts regarding
the continued viability of the Guidelines 23 and generated more than
one hundred lower court opinions, many reaching wildly disparate
conclusions over appropriate post-Blakely sentencing procedures in
the first two months.24  Thousands of federal prosecutions were
affected. The courts, prosecutors and the defense bar cobbled
together proceedings in an attempt to meet the requirements of the
opinion, while at the same time wondering whether all of this work
120. 519 U.S. 148, 156-59 (1997) (per curiam) (holding that acquitted conduct was
properly considered by a judge in determining where to sentence a defendant).
121. See United States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d. 79, 83 n.9 (D. Mass. 2004)
(arguing that the Watts holding will be mooted if Blakely requires that the Guidelines be
considered advisory, rather than mandatory).
122. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 n.9. (2004) (stating that "[t]he
Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on them").
123. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2004) (declaring
Federal Guidelines unconstitutional as a violation of the Sixth Amendment, as per
Blakely), vacated and remanded by United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005); United
States v. Penaranda, 375 F.3d 238, 240 (2d Cir. 2004) (certifying question to the Supreme
Court), certified question dismissed by United States v. Penaranda, 125 S. Ct. 984 (2005);
United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 467-69 (5th Cir. 2004) (declaring Guidelines
constitutional), judgment vacated by Pineiro v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1003 (2005);
United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 354 (4th Cir. 2004) (upholding the Guidelines,
but recommending that lower courts issue a second sentence that assumes that the
Guidelines are advisory), judgment vacated by Hammoud v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1051
(2005).
124. It has been noted that:
[Courts] are taking, and will likely continue to take, many divergent approaches
in response to Blakely-from upholding the Guidelines, to declaring them
unconstitutional, to declaring them unconstitutional only insofar as upward
adjustments to the base offense level and then sentencing within that level, to
authorizing (or refusing to authorize) juries to resolve disputed sentencing
enhancements.
Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (statement of Alan Vinegrad, former federal
prosecutor who served as United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York)
(last visited Feb. 14, 2005), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=
1260&wit-id=3686 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Cases and materials are
collected at Professor Douglas Berman's weblog, Sentencing Law and Policy,
http://sentencing.typepad.com. (last visited Feb. 12, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
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was necessary. Superseding indictments alleging "sentencing facts"
were drafted by prosecutors and handed down by grand juries. In
some cases "sentencing juries" were convened, despite the absence of
federal rules that contemplate such a procedure. In other courts, the
decision was a windfall to the defense bar and specific criminals, with
defendants in cases running the gamut from armed drug dealing to
multi-million-dollar fraud schemes to child pornography receiving
lighter sentences from judges who believed themselves barred from
finding facts that enhance sentences. The Fourth Circuit upheld the
Guidelines, while ordering courts to issue two sentences-a
"Blakelyized" sentence and a sentence under the Guidelines, just in
case it was wrong.'25 The Second Circuit certified the question of the
Guidelines' continued vitality directly to the Supreme Court.
126
Petitions for review of sentences poured into the appellate courts.
Congress responded as well. The Senate passed a concurrent
resolution explaining that it was Congress's intention that the
Guidelines be applied as a whole, rather than being severed to the
benefit of defendants, and asking for rapid resolution regarding
Blakely's application to the Federal Guidelines.'27 Proposals to "lift
the lid" on the Guidelines by removing the upper end of sentencing
ranges vied with proposals to make the Guidelines advisory only as
first passes at a legislative fix. 2 ' More comprehensive restructuring of
the criminal code may be in the offing. Institutional actors such as the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, the Solicitor General,
and the United States Sentencing Commission made responding to
Blakely a top priority. The Court placed the role of the jury atop the
agenda for a multitude of actors.
125. See Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 353 (holding that district courts should issue one
sentence formulated "in accordance with" the Guidelines, as well as another sentence
treating the Guidelines as merely "advisory").
126. Penaranda, 375 F.3d at 240.
127. See S. Con. Res. 130, 108th Cong., 150 CONG. REC. S8574 (July 21, 2004) (stating
"[t]hat it is the sense of Congress that the Supreme Court of the United States should act
expeditiously to resolve the current confusion and inconsistency in the Federal criminal
justice system by promptly considering and ruling on the constitutionality of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines").
128. Also known as the "Bowman proposal." See Frank Bowman, Memorandum
Presenting a Proposal for Bringing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines into Conformity with
Blakely v. Washington, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 364, 365-66 (June 2004). Professor Bowman
reiterated his proposal in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Blakely v.
Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Testimony, Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (statement of Frank Bowman) (last visited
Feb. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Bowman Proposal], available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-testimony.cfm?id=1260&witid=647 (on file with North
Carolina Law Review).
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IV. AFTER BLAKELY, How DOES THIS RENEWED JURY RIGHT
AFFECT THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE SYSTEM?
The problems the participants face in the criminal justice system
in the post-Blakely world are wide-ranging.129  The courts will be
asked to consider double jeopardy and ex post facto issues arising for
defendants who pled but had not been sentenced when Blakely was
decided and to perform retroactivity analysis under Teague v. Lane3°
(i.e., was Blakely a watershed rule of criminal procedure or a logical
extension of the Apprendi principle?' Will Booker be a watershed
rule?). Some courts have imposed dual sentences, anticipating the
need to re-sentence perhaps thousands of defendants after Booker.
13 2
Prosecutors face similarly complex questions.133  Should
indictments be changed to include all potentially enhancing facts, so
that they could be argued to juries? If so, which facts qualify? What
should special verdict forms require? Did Blakely change the
traditional evidentiary balances enacted in Rules 401 and 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, if facts once thought to be sentencing
factors are now the functional equivalent of elements and now must
be proved to a jury? How should one's plea-bargaining posture be
changed in response to the new uncertainty? Does the change
require a return to charge-bargaining, and the concomitant loss of the
transparency the Guidelines were expected to create? If so, how does
that affect charging decisions? Are opening statements and
arguments going to include facts that were once off limits, because the
jury must find them in its verdict to support the sentence ultimately
sought?. In the absence of charge-bargaining, how much "sentencing
factor bargaining" is proper? Booker made the Federal Guidelines
advisory, but has not answered many of these questions, nor did it
answer any of them for state prosecutors.
129. Immediately after Blakely, the lower courts reached fundamentally different
answers to such issues as the facial validity of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines;
severability of various enhancement provisions and the application of such provisions with
or without jury findings of fact and whether such severance complies with legislative
intent; and whether the Constitution requires that sentencing juries be empaneled, and if
so, whether the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permitted such action.
130. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
131. See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 316,
323-24 (2004).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 354 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding
that district courts should issue one sentence formulated "in accordance with" the
Guidelines, as well as another sentence treating the Guidelines as merely "advisory").
133. See James Comey, Department of Justice Legal Positions and Policies in Light of
Blakely v. Washington, reprinted in 16 FED. SENT. REP. 357, 357-59 (2004).
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The defense bar's response to the logic of the Blakely line of
cases is likely to be wide-ranging. We might reasonably expect to see
the reintroduction of the arguments in favor of a Sixth Amendment
right to argue for nullification, for all of the democracy-reinforcing
reasons that the Framers envisioned and which the passage of time
has not altered. If the role of the jury is really to serve a democracy-
reinforcing function in addition to a factfinding function, the current
system clearly creates an information deficit problem. Historically,
jurors knew the penalty to which a felon was exposed. But, as Justice
O'Connor makes clear in her Blakely dissent, things are different
now. Juries are basing their decisions to convict or acquit in the
absence of critical information-the sentence to which they are
exposing the defendant-and counsel are prohibited from providing
that information at trial. If juries are really to serve as constitutional
circuitbreakers, they cannot act as a check on democracy failure in
the legislature if they do not know what will happen to the defendant
if they convict.
The democracy-reinforcing function works when the likely
response of jurors has to be considered by drafters writing their
statutes on Capitol Hill just as much as by the prosecutors deciding to
charge in a particular case. If jurors were, as Professor Amar notes,134
intended to serve as independent checks on abuses of legislative as
well as executive power, there is a fundamental breakdown in their
ability to act as a critical check on the system. The proportionality
review the Framers envisioned has disappeared under a smokescreen
of sentencing tables and "sentencing facts." Under such
circumstances, the Court's countermajoritarian role is implicated
more than ever, because the legislature is overreaching in precisely
the manner the jury is intended to check. If the legislature is
permitted to strip away the protection the jury is meant to provide,
while at the same time reducing the transparency and hence political
accountability of its sentencing schemes, there is nothing left of the
intended checks and balances. This rejuvenation of the jury could be
explained as part of a structural constitution project in which Justices
Scalia and Thomas are key participants. The concern with checks and
balances that invigorates their federalism opinions reemerges in this
context as concern for reinvigorating the jury's role as a check. The
structural concern seems congruent with the Rehnquist Court's
rejuvenation of federalism, applying checks and balances to protect
134. See AMAR, supra note 24, at 83-96.
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the structural separation of powers.'35 But Rehnquist, Kennedy, and
O'Connor have abandoned this majority in the Blakely line of cases.
Perhaps they will change their minds when their short-term fears of
disrupting the system have receded.136
The Blakely line of cases has ignited a discussion among the
branches over the role of the jury-and the discussion is instructive as
a way to evaluate the changing perceptions of the jury's place at the
constitutional center. Professor Rachel Barkow, a former clerk for
Justice Scalia, testified before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
regarding the appropriate response to Blakely. While acknowledging
that the issue of practical consequence was the future of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, she reminded the Committee of the real issue
at stake, and of its institutional role: "This hearing is, at its core, about
the importance of the criminal jury.... [i]t is one of the cornerstones
of our constitutional structure, and we should all strive to maintain its
vitality." '137
Professor Barkow is one of the leading proponents of the jury's
role, and her pre-Blakely articles have proved prescient.138 In a
November 2003 article, she proposed that the Court revisit the
element issue in Blakely and argued that "the key determinant should
be whether a binding law links the presence or absence of a fact with
a prescribed amount of punishment and limits judicial discretion to
depart from that legislative judgment by allowing the government to
135. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551, 567 (1995) (holding that the
Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 was an impermissible broadening of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause). See generally John 0. McGinnis, Continuity and
Coherence in the Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 875 (2003) (noting the
longstanding commitment of the Rehnquist Court to the principles of federalism and
judicial restraint).
136. Or perhaps they may buy a ticket to Apprendi-land so they can have a larger role
in shaping its future. The remedy majority in Booker returned us almost to the status quo,
but the larger Blakely principle was also vindicated in the Stevens opinion for the Court.
Before Booker, the short-term shock to the system created by Blakely was rapidly being
absorbed as attorneys and judges adjusted their charging, negotiating and trial practices to
fit the new mandate. It remains to be seen what adjustments will be necessary once
Congress and the state legislatures change the various structured sentencing systems to
accommodate the new mandate.
137. Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (statement of Rachel E. Barkow) (last
visited Mar. 28,. 2005), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-testimony.cfm?id=
1260&wit_id=3684 (on file with North Carolina Law Review).
138. See generally Rachel Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's
Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33 (2003)
(urging increased jury participation in criminal trials-particularly at the sentencing
phase-as a check on government power).
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seek review of the judge's decision."39
This is the position ultimately reached by the Court in Blakely.
Professor Doug Berman's weblog, Sentencing Law and Policy140 has
become the informational locus of the debate, with multiple courts
citing it in opinions, and serious scholars of sentencing policy
checking it almost daily. Opinions and other source materials appear
there within hours, rendering it the equivalent of a real-time treatise
that the participants consult as they shape the debate. Professor
Frank Bowman also spoke to the Judiciary Committee and the
United States Sentencing Commission, proposing that the upper-end
of the Guideline ranges be increased to the statutory maximum as a
stop-gap measure, until a more comprehensive solution to the jury
issues could be enacted. 41 The way the Blakely debate is unfolding
tells us something about the way the United States as a body politic
goes about incorporating mainstream values. The widespread
reaction after Blakely, with immediate responses from Congress, state
legislatures, sentencing commissions, editorial pages and interest
groups shows that the Court placed the constitutional role of the jury
on the national agenda for discussion. Yet to be resolved are the
second and third waves of issues that will inevitably arise as the
system seeks to incorporate the Blakely mandate, involving reform of
the federal and state sentencing schemes and criminal codes, and
perhaps a renewed debate on the wisdom of mandatory minima and
the incarceration rate in the United States compared to the rest of the
world.
For Congress, Blakely has been the basis for renewed
consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines. The Judiciary
Committee responded with hearings within three weeks after Blakely
was handed down, and there is no question that the members
recognized that the opinion was significant, or that the Court's
concerns would have to be addressed in any successor regime.'42
"While we may disagree with Justice Scalia's opinion, we must
recognize that a majority of the Court has spoken. Like the federal
judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys who must now grapple with
the scope and impact of the Blakely opinion, we in Congress are
139. Id. at 46.
140. See Sentencing Law and Policy, supra note 124.
141. See Bowman Proposal, supra note 128.
142. Blakely was decided June 24, 2004. The United States Senate Committee on the
Judiciary held hearings on Blakely v. Washington and the future of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines on July 13, 2004.
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concerned."143
But what are the limitations Congress now faces? Does Blakely
signal the end of the nation's twenty-five-year-old structured
sentencing project with congressionally mandated limits on judicial
discretion? Do we in fact live in a binary world, where the only
choices are structured sentencing in its current form or wildly
unrestrained sentencing disparities? Obviously not. As this is
written, there is already evidence that sentencing facts can be found
by juries beyond a reasonable doubt.1"
There are proposals for quick fixes before Congress, as well as
the beginnings of proposals for long-term changes.145 There has been
discussion of raising the upper end of the Guidelines' range for all
sentences to the statutory maximum,146 obviating the apparent
stricture of Blakely's rule, although that means that the range would
be skewed upward in a way unanticipated when the Guidelines were
first enacted. There has already been the beginning of a dialogue on
the wisdom of enacting new statutes with mandatory minima, a
response which moves the sentencing decision even further away
from the individual. As many are quick to point out, this solution
may amount to using a legislative sledgehammer to limit the
perceived problem of runaway judging.
In the criminal context, we have a ready historical analogue for
this kind of discussion in the Miranda v. Arizona147 opinion and the
consequent debate on the rights of the accused under the Fifth
Amendment,'148 although the effects of Blakely may far outstrip
143. Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
(last visited Feb. 14, 2005), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1260
&wit-id=2629 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
144. See United States Sentencing Commission, Preliminary Findings: Federal
Sentencing Practices Subsequent to the Supreme Court's Decision in Blakely v.
Washington, at *3 (last visited Mar. 28, 2005), available at http:/lwww.ussc.govlBlakelyl
blakelyoutreachpreliminaryfindings.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
145. See, e.g., Testimony of Frank 0. Bowman, III, Before the Subcomm. on Crime
Terrorism and Homeland Security, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives, Feb. 10, 2005, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/
Bowman021005.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Testimony of
Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Attorney General, Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives, Feb. 10, 2005, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/
Wray021005.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
146. See Testimony of Frank 0 Bowman, 1II, supra note 145.
147. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
148. See generally Yale Kamisar, Foreword, From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson to
. 99 MICH. L. REV. 879 (2001) (noting the Supreme Court's difficulty with defining the
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Miranda.149  Congress acted quickly to overturn Miranda, the
executive never sought to enforce the legislation intended to repeal it,
and the Court ultimately rebuffed the attempt. 150  Nonetheless,
Miranda is a "central" opinion, that defines the contours of the Fifth
Amendment right to silence in very specific terms. The role of public
opinion, and of the Justices' interest in the protection of the Court's
prerogatives as arbiter of the Constitution, in the Dickerson
151
decision was critical. In fact one could argue that Miranda was
upheld as much because the nation can recite the warning as because
all of the Justices who voted for it believe it has a firmly-rooted basis
in constitutional theory. Whether the jury reaches the same status in
the public's consciousness remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
As this is written, the judicial, executive, and legislative branches
are scrambling to figure out how to respond to the Court's
determination that the right to a jury determination of the facts
essential to a defendant's sentence is "no mere procedural formality,
but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional
structure."'52  The fact that the political science models failed to
predict the outcome, and that the "centrist" Justices voted against it,
reminds us of the importance of considering bedrock doctrinal issues
as we set about defining mainstream values. The way the debate has
been shaped since the Court placed the issue on the national agenda
in Jones reminds us of the interactive nature of the process. Multiple
participants from all of the branches, as well as the public, are
weighing in on the role of the jury, and the outcome is still being
shaped. Our history, constitutional structure, and evolving concerns
regarding fairness to the accused all overlap to establish the right to a
jury trial as a mainstream value. A clear definition of what it means
to define elements and set punishments in a way that respects the jury
right is essential if we are going to engage in a meaningful dialogue
going forward. The Blakely earthquake foreseen by Justice
O'Connor was real, but the lasting effects will be readily absorbed by
the system, once we get past the period of uncertainty brought on by
the opinion. How closely we guard the right to a jury trial, and
balance the structural and substantive concerns that that right
constitutional rights of criminal defendants pursuant to Miranda).
149. See Sentencing Law and Policy, supra note 124.
150. See Kamisar, supra note 148.
151. United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
152. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538-39 (2004).
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implicates, are worthy of reconsideration by the centrists.
